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LOOKINO FOR DEFAULT RULE
LEGITIMACY IN ALL THE
WRONG PLACES: A
CRITIQUE OF THE
AUTHORITY OF CONTRACT
MODEL AND THE COORDINATION
PRINCIPLE PROPOSED BY
PROFESSOR BURTON
JULIET

P.

KOSTRITSKY*

INTRODUCTION
Default rule theories dominate contract scholarship.' Law-supplied default rules apply when parties fail to expressly resolve certain
matters by contract. 2 Cases of omission raise the fundamental question of whether the law should supply a contractual term when the
parties themselves fail to do SO.3 To identify and justify appropriate
default rules, scholars have formulated a variety of approaches including efficiency," communitarianism," and relationalism." According to
... Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University, B.A. 1976, Harvard College; J.D.
1980, University of Wisconsin.
The author wishes to thank Ronald J. Coffey and Andrew P. Morriss. Eric E. Kinder,

Michael Cullers, Kathleen Mara and BJ. Martino provided valuable research assistance.
1. Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S.
CAL INTERDIsc. L.J. 115, 116 (1993).

2. "These rules establish contract rights, obligations, and powers needed to resolve disputes when the parties' agreement is indeterminate with respect to the result." Jd. TWo sources
(at least) contribute to this contractual incompleteness: the transaction costs of achieving contractual completeness and strategic behavior. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92-95 (1989)
(discussing these differing sources of contractual incompleteness).
3. These terms are usually non-mandatory.
Burton, supra note 1, at 116.
4. In resolving what term. if any, the law should supply, the law must resolve whether it
should intervene at all, requiring "projection ... [of] how the ultimate results sought ... will be
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Professor Burton all of the current default rules scholarship suffers
from a critical deficiency: it fails to provide a legitimacy justification
for imposing default rules on parties who have not expressl~ adop~e?
them by contract," To remedy this deficiency and to provide legitimacy, Burton proposes that current approaches to setting d~fault ru~~s
be replaced with a coordination principle-one that "derives legitimacy from a certain view of fairness."
The need to legitimate contract default rules unquestionably
demands attention." The Burton philosophical model for judging the
legitimacy of default rules, however, may be misconceived. First,
because Professor Burton's model is based on a fully contingent,
determinate contract, it may be inappropriate for judging the more
typical incomplete, indeterminate contract.l? Professor Burton's use
of such a model stems from his failure to recognize that the very
nature of contractual agreement. extends beyond terms expressly
furthered or frustrated by the use of interventions." Ronald J. Coffey, Perspectives on Legal
Methods 4 (July 6, 1990) (unpubtished manuscript, on file with the author). This problem of
justification is a major one because the "parties are being held in contract to terms to which they
did not explicitly agree." Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default
Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & Pea. POL'y 639, 641 (1989).
Efficiency proponents addressing default rules include Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2; David
Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 1815 (1991); Ronald 1. Coffey, Firm Opportunities: Property Right Assignments, Firm Detriment, and the Agent's Performance Obligation, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 155 (1988); Jason S. Johnston,
Opting In and Opting Out: Bargaining for Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 291 (1992); David 1. Levine, Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker
Adverse Selection, 9 J. LAB. Eco». 294 (1991); Stewart Schwab, Shirking, Opportunistic Firings,
and Contract-Law Limitations on At-Will Employment (Dec. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the author); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
5. See Burton, supra note 1, at 117 0.5; see also Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to
Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 858.;;0 (1983) (discussing utopian aspects of Local 1330,
United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980)).
6. For Ian Macneil's contribution to contracts scholarship and relationalism, and a discussion thereof, see Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long- Term Economic Relations
Under Classical. Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978); William C. Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 545.
7. Burton, supra note 1, at 117 ("Contract law, like all law, should have legitimacy; it
should enforce only the genuine political obligations of the people SUbjected to official
coercion. ").
8. /d. at lIB.

9. I disagree, however, with Professor Burton's contention that contract theorists have
heretofore neglected the legitimacy topic. See id. at 120, Law.and-economics theorists have
attempted to legitimize default rules in hypothetical consent terms. See, e.g., Coleman et al.,
supra note 4, .at 644. Burton, however, rejects those efforts as flawed. Burton, supra note I, at
120; see also infra part IV.
10. See Coleman et a1.,su.p~a ~ote4, at ~O (stating that contracts often remain incomplete
because of the cost of fully specifying all contingencies).
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agreed to and includes law-supplied default rules that exist as "an
inherent part of the contract calculus."!' Because Professor Burton
narrowly confines contract legitimacy to those terms expressly
adopted by the parties, he proposes a legitimacy model for default
rules that will necessarily regard such rules as externally imposed and
therefore illegitimate unless they can be justified as ordinary civil laws
are legitimated-by reference to a "ground of political obligation.t'P
Second, Professor Burton's attempt to construct a morality from a
description of the characteristics of promise-making activity fails to
provide a normative guide for making principled choices among competing default rules when the parties have failed to explicitly resolve
an issue by agreement."
Finally, this comment suggests that in endorsing the coordination
principle;" Professor Burton has left unanswered the fundamental
question of why the law should supply a default term requiring coordination. Although the principle may seem intuitively fair!' and
although Professor Burton finds coordination to be part of the parties'
implicit agreement," Burton never completely justifies why coordination inheres in their implicit agreement.
Justifying a law-supplied term of coordination requires a decision
maker to advert to an economic model."? Such a model could identify
what obstacles, including transaction costs, the parties face in negotiating (1) an express contract to detail coordination problems, and (2)
a more generalized commitment of coordination. The scholar of
default rules must explore not only the question of why the parties
could not negotiate for an express clause covering coordination
problems for unknown contingencies, but also why the parties could
not or might not negotiate for a general, clause requiring coordination." Assuming that the decision maker finds obstacles to expressly
11.

See Clayton P. Gillette, Cooperation and Convention in Contractual Defaults, 3 S. CAL.
L.J, 167, 172 (1993).
Burton, supra note 1, at 120 ("A law has legitimate authority if it enforces a genuine

INTERDISC.

12.

political obligation of its subjects.").
13. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising,
88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 504-505 (1989) (questioning ability of philosophical literature on the
nature of promising to select appropriate default rules).
14. See Burton, supra note 1, part III.

15. ld. at 156-57,
16. [d. at 161 ("Like the implied covenant of good faith, the general obligation to coordinate is made whether or not the parties have it in mind.").

17, See infra part IV.
18. A general clause might obligate the parties to work out coordination problems by
agreeing to cooperate whenever a dispute arose in the future. Professor Williamson suggests
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negotiating for a coordination clause, the decision maker should then
ask whether the parties would have bargained to include the term
were these barriers not present. To answer that question, the decision
maker should consider whether cheaper private alternatives for
achieving the same goal of coordination existed at the time. If the
decision maker concludes that a liability rule imposing a coordination
principle is (1) one that the parties would have agreed to include were
it not for certain obstacles, and (2) a less costly alternative to overcoming the barriers to its express inclusion, then the law should set a
default rule of coordination.
Without answering questions about how parties subject to the liability rule of coordination would react to it, and whether imposing the
rule will achieve or hinder the parties' private goals and at what cost,"?
the decision maker cannot resolve whether the rule would be preferred by the parties. Absent a structure of economic analysis, a
model of average goals of the parties, and projected responses to and
costs of various rules," the decision maker must fall back on the argument that the coordination principle should be adopted because it is
fair. However, if one regards contract as in the realm of private decision making, then it is important that any law-supplied default rule be
grounded in consent. With an economic model of rational decision
making, the scholar can provide a consent-based rationale for a lawsupplied rule. It is, therefore, not necessary to "think of some default
rules [as] outside the parties' agreement .... "21
I. BURTON'S AUTHORITY OF CONTRACT: A MODEL

GEARED TO THE FULLY CONTINGENT
CONTRACT
Burton argues that default rules based on principles such as efficiency "lack a legitimating basis or fail to respect the authority of the
contract.vs- However, the criteria he selects for jUdging the legitimate
authority of ~ontract seem too closely allied with the paradigm of the
fully determinate express contract. These criteria are inappropriate
arbiters of default rules for the non-fully contingent contract. They
erroneously lead Professor Burton to (1) place too great an emphasis
that opportunism will interfere with such general clauses in contracts requiring cooperation.
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 50-51 (1985).
19. Coffey, supra note 4, at 4.
20. [d.
21. Burton, supra note 1, at 155.
22. [d. at 117.
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on the express terms' legitimacy, (2) give undue weight to a practical
guidance function of rules without providing a methodology for guidance when the contract is incomplete, and (3) improperly exclude
default rules as illegitimate if they require any costlbenefit analysis ex
post.
A.

THE PRIMACY OF EXPRESS TERMS

Burton's model gives exclusive legitimacy to the express private
agreement of the parties. It regards the rules supplied by non-party
decision makers as necessarily lacking such legitimacy. Express terms
"need not be justified as anything more than the parties' desires. "23
Because default rules fall outside the parties' express agreement, they
must be legitimated since the "supplied term is a deal the parties
never made. "24 No contract, even with express language, can be selfinterpreting." Therefore, the vision of a bifurcated world in which
some terms-express
ones-are
presumptively legitimate because
they are grounded in private agreement, and other terms-law-supplied ones-are somehow in need of a legitimating authority, is false.
If one accepts the reality of necessarily incomplete contracts (because
of the transaction costs of complete specificity), even express contracts require interpretation which will entail default-rule choices
outside the express terms of the contract."
An inevitable blurring between express and implied terms occurs,
requiring a legitimacy model to cover all of these terms. Because it
may be costly to specify all terms expressly, parties may deliberately
choose to leave certain matters open." It may therefore be inappropriate to regard the implied terms as automatically nonconsensual."
Instead, such terms implied by default rules can be understood to be
essential parts of the contract agreement, "rather than ... defaults ...
imposed when the contract runs out .... "29 Under a broader view of
the nature of contracting.'? under which parties inevitably fail to
resolve all matters by explicit agreement, one can construct a consent23. [d. at 120 n.17.
24. [d. at 135.
25. Cbarny. supra note 4, at 1819.
26. [d.
27. Gillette, supra note 11, at 172.
28. [d.
29. [d. at 169.
30. [d. (Burton'S project is contingent on acceptance of his narrow view of the reach of

contractual agreement, while Gillette's work is based on a broader view of the nature of
contracting).
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based rationale for default rules. On the assumption that the default
rule is a less costly means of achieving the parties' private goals than
other private devices, one can conclude the parties would therefore
prefer the rule as a means of minimizing transaction costs."
The primacy given to express obligation, and the faith in parties'
ability to allocate all risks ex ante by contract, explains Burton's critique of J.J. Brooksbank Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp.t? In
Brooksbank, a licensing agreement between Budget and Brooksbank
governed their relationship." As an early licensee, Brooksbank
received a favorable deal: "The [1962] agreement required Budget to
maintain reservation offic~s in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago
and to forward to Brooksbank all reservations made at all its offices at
no charge to Brooksbank.">' One-third of Brooksbank's out-of-town
reservations came from these three offices." When Budget adopted a
central reservation system using a single toll-free 800 number,
"Brooksbank sought a declaration that the 1962 agreement entitled it
to free reservations from Budget's central reservations office.">
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Brooksbank's claim that
it was entitled to free reservations under its contract with Budget, and
granted Brooksbank reservations at two-thirds of their cost.'? The
court justified this allocation and the departure from the literal reading of the agreement entitling the claimant to free reservations by
finding that "the 1962 agreement was based on the parties' interests in
the effective flow of reservations while rewarding Brooksbank's willingness to sign with Budget early in the history of the car rental business."38 Moreover, because Brooksbank had received one-third of its
business at no charge, a declaratory judgment granting Brooksbank
reservations at two-thirds of their cost would preserve the "essential
bargain" the parties had made."
31. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E, Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice:An Analysis
of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261, 262
(1985). But see id. at 264 (suggesting that default rules may generate costs and negative incentive to innovate).
32. 337 N.W.2d 372 (Minn. 1983).
33. ld. at 373.
34.

Burton, supra note 1, at 132.

35. Brooksbank, 337 N.W.2d at 374.
36. Burton, supra note 1, at 132.
37. Brooksbank, 337 N.W.2d at 377.
38.

Burton, supra note I, at 132.

39. Brooksbank, 337 N.W.2d at 377.
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Burton criticizes the result in Brooksbank because of the court's
failure "to respect the contract's authority.v'" Burton argues that the
court should have resolved the matter "on the basis of the express
contract language, interpreted literally," and enforced Budget's obligation to furnish reservations free of charge to Brooksbank." Denigrating the court's balancing of the parties' competing interests in
order to arrive at the compromise, Burton asserts that "[i]t defeats the
purpose of the directive to ... revisit the balance of ex ante interests
when determining what to do ex pOSt."42According to Burton, such
balancing is improper because the "agreement's directives should supplant those considerations .... "43 Regardless of whether the court
reached the correct result, Burton's critique of the result suggests an
unrealistic faith in the literal meaning of words and too great an
emphasis on promises as the exclusive source of obligation.
Burton's critique of Brooksbank suggests that legitimate obligation must be grounded in an express agreement. This approach
ignores the inevitable ambiguity in agreements."
Further, this
approach assumes that all risks can be allocated ex ante by agreement,
making any later balancing by the court improper. Professor Burton
apparently never considered the possibility that while the contract language was clear and authoritative ("free of charge"), this language
was not intended by the parties to refer to the completely different
context of an 800 toll-free reservation system, or that the parties never
contemplated this change. When an agreement is indeterminate," the
court needs a methodology for achieving the parties' interests and
goals, and balancing the costs of intervention against the costs of
nonintervention.
B.

PRAcnCAL

GUIDANCE

Other, elements in the Burton authority model also reflect a bias
toward the complete contingent contract. Under Burton's model the
authority of contract derives in part from its practical authority: "Laws
40.
41.

Burton, supra note I, at 133.
Id. at 164.

42. Id. at 133.
43. Id. The "directives" presumably refer to the contract provisions.
44. See Cherny. supra note 4, at 1819.
45. Of course, Professor Burton assumes away any indeterminacy in the language. Cf.
Brooksbank. 337 N.W.2d at 375 (discussing contract incompleteness on issue of technological
changes in the reservation system).

.;it
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and contracts are supposed to guide conduct as a practical matter. "46
The complete contingent contract seems better able to meet this criterion of practical authority and guidance than an incomplete contract
which cannot act as a practical guide, at least as to those matters not
covered in the agreement. Even if practical guidance is important and
can be achieved through default rules, if the express agreement fails to
provide practical guidance, then one is left with the question of how to
choose a default rule that will provide practical guidance to the parties. Since many different default rules potentially could provide practical guidance, the fundamental question is how to choose among
various default rules and how to justify the choice of a particular
default rule. The question remains: what principle should inform the
choice of a particular rule? To resolve that question, the decision
maker needs a model of parties' average goals and needs to resolve
the question of whether a particular default rule is appropriate: he/
she must ask how the parties will respond to various alternative rules
and whether the law-supplied rule will achieve the goals of average
parties and at what cost. Resolving these questions requires the decision maker to advert to an economic model."?
C.

REBALANCING

The third element of the Burton authority model requires an
authoritative law that precludes a rebalancing of the costs and benefits
of the law.48 To the extent that this element must function as a more
general basis for the legitimacy of default rules in the context of a
necessarily incomplete contract, it suffers from the same shortcomings
as the other elements: practical guidance and the primacy of express
obligation.
The Burton model focuses on a paradigm law-stopping at a red
light-that settles all issues and precludes a balancing of costs and
benefits of the law. The ideal legitimate Burton law precludes a "revisiting" of the "reasons on which it is based."49 For a law to be legitimate in Burton's model, it should tell the motorist how to behave.

46.

Burton, supra note I, at 124.

47, ld. (rejecting the relevance of economic analysis because it merely "offer[s] theoretical
observations. not practical guidance").
.
48. ld. at 126.
49. ld.
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Further, the law would not be authoritative, and would thus be illegitimate, if one could not "identify the directive's content without revisiting all the reasons on which it is based. "50 "Thus, a legitimate traffic
law will help a motorist to better fulfill her obligation to coordinate
then if she simply considered the balance of safety and efficiency on
each encounter with a red light."51
The implication seems to be that for a law to be authoritative and
legitimate, it must be accepted unquestioningly and must obviate the
need for rebalancing interests. In the context of a "stop at red lights"
law, it may make sense to respect the command of the law and to
preclude a weighing of costs and benefits ex post. The legislature is
empowered to weigh costs and benefits, to adopt legislation that
reflects the majority's view of the proper balance, and to document
and defend that balance in legislative hearings. Allowing individuals
to opt out and deviate from the law would undermine the power of
the legislature to adopt and enforce its laws.
Compare, however, the different paradigm of the incomplete
contract, where the filling of gaps necessarily involves the court in
weighing the costs and benefits of alternative approaches. In the context of an incomplete contract, or a contract which appears complete
but does not address changing circumstances, confining legitimacy to
laws which respect the "directive's content" seems unsuitable. If the
parties have not provided for a term, it is difficult for the legal decision maker to identify and respect the "directive's content." A legal
decision maker cannot construct an appropriate default rule for such
cases without weighing the costs and benefits of alternative
approaches. Where legislation does not exist and parties are contracting, one or both parties may decide to leave certain issues open.
The legal decision maker must then choose among alternative possible
legal rules. The process used by the court should be similar to the one
used by a legislative decision maker in choosing among possible laws.
If the matter falls outside the legislative domain, or outside express
resolution by contract, the legal decision maker must then do what
any legislative decision maker would do by asking, "[Wjhat goals or
objectives will be served or jeopardized-promoted
or threatened ...
-by a response awarding (or withholding) a property right or imposing (or not imposing) liability, in light of the response's likely effect on
50. Id.
51. Id. at 125-26.
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those who will be affected by litigation (immediate or future) or on
those who will avoid litigation by adjusting their behavior?"52
Thus, the process of formulating a legal rule starts from a very
different basis than the authoritative model. The legal decision maker
starts with a model of human behavior and decides "what goals ...
individuals of the type involved in the controversy pursue in making
their private choicesj.]?" Having established those goals, the decision
maker should determine whether certain "goals selected as worthy"
will be "furthered or frustrated" by a legal default rule, given formulations about how average actors will react to the various rules." Thus,
in judging the legitimacy of default rules, it may be appropriate to
start not with whether these rules command unquestioning respect,
but rather-given assumptions about how people are likely to respond
to alternative rules-with the question of how well the rules achieve
certain goals.
Burton's focus on criteria developed in relation to an ideal of an
express contract-practical guidance, the primacy afforded express
obligations, and the ideal of a law which resolves all issues ex anteobscures important issues.55 The issue should not be whether an
incomplete agreement provides practical guidance for the parties, or
whether such guidance arises from the explicit bargain. The incomplete agreement will always be deficient in satisfying those criteria.
The decision maker Should instead focus on how the incomplete
agreement should be filled in, what methodology is appropriate, and
how it can be justified? Once a methodology is chosen, the court can
fill in the gaps and the law-supplied terms will presumably supply the
practical guidance that is inevitably lacking in an incomplete
agreement.
II.

PROMISE-MAKING CHARACfERISTICS:
TO NORMS

IMPORTATION

The second failing of the authority model used for judging the
legitimacy of default rules is that it builds on philosophical literature
52.
benefits
53.
54.

Coffey, supra note 4, at 2. Presumably even for legislation, a balancing of costs and
may be required if the scope or interpretation of the statute is unclear.
[d. at 4.
[d.

55. A too-narrow primacy given to obligations established by the express contract, and a
too-great emphasis on directive content leads Burton to summarily reject relational norms as a
basis for default rules. See Burton, supra note 1, at 141-44. Relational norms could be important
in identifying a behavioral reality necessary in determining the likely effect of rules on parties.
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detailing what all promises have in common, and focuses on factors
that do not provide a larger framework for deciding which legal
default rule is appropriate/" The problem with finding authority for a
contractual obligation based on whether it has certain promissory
characteristics-including the characteristic of excluding certain reasons of party interest-is that "its focus is implicitly limited to cases
where there is no question that a promise has been made, and no difficulty in determining the exact content of the promised action .... "57
The promissory characteristic of excluding certain "reasons of
personal interest upon which the deal is based in the first place"58can
be illustrated as follows: if W promises to repay a loan on Tuesday, a
contract will prevent W from simply deciding that it is inconvenient to
repay the loan on Tuesday." The borrower may not seek excuse on
inconvenience grounds because "[t]he agreed and determinate payment term supplants these considerations with a reason for timely
payment stemming from the payment term.t"?
The shortcomings of an analysis based on the promissory characteristic of excluding reasons of interest as a foundation for judging
default rules can be illustrated by extending it to the indeterminate
contract. If an output or requirements contract's terms are indeterminate and give one party discretion, traditional doctrine requires that
the party with discretion exclude certain reasons for non-performance-she may not act to recapture opportunities foregone at the time
of contracting.s- Burton justifies this exclusion of a reason in performance by explaining that "[tjhe agreement excluded price from the
buyer's reasons for action in contract performance because price considerations were assessed ex ante, and the deal was concluded. "62
Burton's approach to the indeterminate contract seeks to establish as
authoritative a default rule requiring good faith on the assumption
that such a rule shares one of the qualities of promising-namely that
it excludes certain reasons for acting once a contract is established.

56, Craswell, supra note 13, at 503-05.
57. [d. at 505.
58.
59.

Burton, supra note 1, at 126.
[d. at 126-27.

60. [d. at 127.
61.

ld.; see also Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to PerHARV. L. REV. 369 (1980).

form in Good Faith, 94
62.

Burton, supra note 1, at 127.
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Because the promise excludes certain reasons for acting-such as acting to recapture foregone opportunities-it respects the authority of
contract.
Default rules can be analyzed to determine whether they have
the quality of excluding a certain reason of party interest once the
default-rule calculation has been made. However, Burton's analysis
does not provide a methodology for determining which default rule
should be adopted in the first place: Should the default rule be a
good-faith requirement or some other default rule? What principles
should apply? Nor does the analysis provide a rationale for interpreting the default rule of good faith to exclude acting for the reason of
price speculation in contract performance when the agreement does
not expressly prohibit such speculation. Burton is convinced that the
exclusion of the price speculation reason in output and requirements
contracts can be traced to the agreement itself "because price considerations were assessed ex ante. "63 Predicating the authority of contract on the quality of excluding reasons of interest that were settled
by the initial agreement places too much faith in the ability of the
initial agreement to provide a ready source of exclusions of reasons
for acting. By postulating that the initial agreement will easily resolve
which reasons of self-interest should be excluded, the analysis fails to
grapple with justifying the default rule or the interpretive tests that it
spawns (such as not acting to recapture foregone opportunities). The
methodology for that calculus must lie outside the nature of promissory attributes.
III.

THE COORDINATION PRINCIPLE: JUSTIFYING THE
ADOPTION OF A CONVENTION

Burton's suggested principle for legitimating default rules is
based upon the coordination principle embraced by Hart and Rawls."
The justifications for adopting the principle of coordination leave
unanswered the question of why the law should adopt a convention
even if it is prevalent. To justify why the law should ever supply a
term when the parties have negotiated a contract and failed to
expressly include the term requires a model of how people bargain,
what obstacles or impediments they faced in expressly negotiating a
coordination term, how parties would react to alternative principles,
and what the costs of alternative private approaches to solving the
63.·Id.
64. Id. at 156.
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coordination problems might be. Only by addressing those questions
can one answer the question of why the law should supply a term on
consent grounds. Burton does not seem to address those questions;
rather, he seeks to justify the adoption in other ways.
The first justification for the adoption of the Hart/Rawls coordination principle is that "a contract is a mutually advantageous cooperative venture according to norms ... by which each [party] voluntarily
restricts his or her liberty to yield advantages for both .... Therefore,
each party, having agreed to cooperate, has a right to a similar cooperation by the other party.r'"
The difficulty with arguing that there is a right to expect "similar
cooperation" is that when one is outside the realm of rights created by
express obligations in the agreement, then one is left with the question
of why there should be a right to expect similar acquiescence to limits
on freedom that are not in the agreement.
Burton justifies the right to the coordination principle by arguing
that it is part of the parties' implicit agreement." "Like the implied
covenant of good faith, the general obligation to coordinate is made
whether or not the parties have it in mind. It is what their contract
means even when it is not what they meant."?" In essence, Burton
finds a convention of coordination that is inherent in the nature of
contracting itself. However, the argument that the law should adopt a
coordination convention because it prevails begs the question of
whether a coordination term should be part of the agreement, and if
so, on what grounds."
The fundamental question unanswered by Burton is this: if the
obligation to coordinate is part of the implicit agreement of the parties, why did they not explicitly include it? To answer this question of
why the law should supply a term the parties neglected to include, the
decision maker must address and detail the obstacles the parties faced
in negotiating expressly for a term. Even if there are obstacles,
including transaction costs, the decision maker should also develop a
model of what the parties' private goals were and whether these private goals would be hindered or advanced by the implication of a rule
65. Id. at 162.
66. Id. at 161.
67. Id.
68. Gillette also raises this objection to adopting conventions, arguing that they are "less
robust for purposes of generating the kinds of political obligations that Burton seeks." Gillette,
supra note 11. at 174.
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of coordination. The decision maker should consider whether the parties had available to them private devices for achieving the goals of
coordination and how costly they were. If the decision maker is convinced that (1) the law-supplied term would accord with the objectives
sought by most parties, and (2) the private devices for achieving those
goals were more costly, only then should the court intervene by supplying a term/"
Under an economic model of parties' private goals, it may be possible to reconceptualize the coordination principle as a term that
would be supplied by courts for efficiency reasons, on the theory that
most parties would bargain for it were the obstacles not too great.
"Contracting parties agree (explicitly or implicitly) to cooperate in the
future, not because of altruism, but because it lowers the ex ante contract price by more than the cost of cooperation.v?? Without a
grounding in efficiency terms, the lawmaker would have no basis for
deriving a normative argument in favor of a coordination convention-one could only point to its prevalence."
IV. AN APPROPRIATE GROUNDING: A LAW-ANDECONOMICS EFFICIENCY APPROACH
If one takes seriously the transaction-cost models of contracting

and recognizes that many barriers necessarily prevent the achievement of fully contingent contracts," and if one accepts a model of
assumptions about what goals average economic actors have, then one
may begin to appreciate why parties leave certain terms incomplete,
as for example, a coordination principle. Once the model is made
more realistic and the legal decision maker appreciates why parties
may not achieve fully contingent contracts, then the question
becomes, What should the law do about it? Should it take a hands-off
approach or should it intervene, and what would be the justifying
rationale for legal intervention? The legal decision maker may decide
that if the costs of private alternatives to overcoming the barriers are
too high, and the term accords with the objectives sought on average
69. Thus, armed with a consent- and efficiency-based justification for default rules, the
decision maker could presumably reject default rules that were not efficient and thus not cptimal. An inquiry into the basis for a convention could better grapple with the normative question
of whether a convention should be supplied by law and provide an "external metric" for judging
conventions, See id. at 176,
70. Scott, supra note 4, at 605.
71. See Gillette, supra note 11, at 176,
72. [d. at 170; see also Scott, supra note 4, at 6fJ7.
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by the parties, then the law should intervene with a term." However,
the law should intervene only if the alternative private devices are
more costly than the benefits that they could achieve, and there are
high costs of not supplying the term based on projections about how
people will respond to alternative rules.?" On balance, supplying the
term may promote efficiency by saving the parties those costs, and at
the same time promote the objectives sought by the parties on average, thus providing a grounding in the consent of the parties. Developing appropriate and legitimate default rules that will allow a
decision maker to make principled choices among competing default
rules requires a different model, one grounded in "real world conditions.r'" one that fully recognizes the "practical impossibility"?" of
achieving fully contingent contracts.
This comment suggests that by looking to the reasons for the
indeterminate contract, developing a model of the structural impediments?? to fully contingent contracts, and drawing on an economic
model of behavior under which actors seek on average a goal of minimizing transaction costs, the law can select an appropriate default
rule-one that the parties would prefer because it will achieve the typical goals of average parties 78 at a lower cost than alternative private
devices the parties might have used to overcome the barriers to completely contingent contracts. Further, by identifying the terms that
rational parties would have agreed to, providing an explanation of the
barriers that parties face in supplying those terms expressly, and identifying the costs of private devices to overcome those barriers, it is
possible to infer a consent to a suggested default rule. Thus the legitimacy issue is a real one, but the legitimacy of contract default rules

73.

Coffey, supra note 4, at 4.

74. [d.
75.

[d.

76.

Coleman et al., supra note 4, at 640.

77. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 18, at 50-51 (detailing transaction-cost impediments to
fully contingent contracts).
78.

See Coffey, supra note 4, at 4.

The formulation of a rule justification with respect to the model facts of a controversy
also requires the decisionmaker, either on the basis of evidence that has been collected
and processed or. where empirical evidence is lacking, on the basis of a priori hypothesis, to make assumptions about how things (including people) behave in reality. What
goals do individuals of the type involved in the controversy pursue in making their
private choices? ... What is common and what is not common in human nature?
[d.
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can be grounded in the moral legitimacy of consent." The court supplies terms under a default rule when it is convinced that the parties
would have struck those terms were it not for certain obstaclesincluding the transaction costs of writing the terms expressly-and
when it is convinced that the law-supplied term under the default rule
is a less costly means of achieving the parties' goals than alternative
private devices available to the parties and therefore is the one that
the parties would prefer over other means of overcoming the obstacles to fully contingent contracts.s? Thus, by accepting an economic
model of decision making, it may be possible to construct plausible
hypothetical bargains, and thus to provide a consensual basis for intervention through law-supplied rules."
A model based on realistic assumptions and the difficulties of
achieving fully contingent contracts moves away from an authority
model of contract, and toward a model which can provide an efficiency justification for choosing among alternative default rules.
V. CRITIQUING THE BURTON DEBUNKING OF
EFFICIENCY
Despite the efficiency arguments that can be made for a law-supplied rule, Professor Burton attacks the efficiency principle because of
its failure "to ground a default principle with legitimate authority.t''<
He posits that according to efficiency there is no theoretical distinction between filling gaps "when the agreement has run out of guidance'<' and the more unjustifiable result of mandating efficient
deals."

Burton attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the efficiency
principle by use of the following example: "Assume that Costello has
$50,000 in a passbook savings account paying 2.25% interest at
Abbott's savings bank. He plans to use the money next year for the
79. The conse~t is a projected one. ~ased on certain assumptions about parties' goals and
values. and the projected costs of alternati~e approaches, one can infer that the parties would
prefer the law-supplied rule and therefore It should be supplied by the legal decision maker.
80. See generally Juliet P, Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk
Costs: A l!efa~lt ~.ulefor ~recon~ra.ctu.al
Negolia~ions, 44 HASTINGS LJ. 621 (1993) (suggesting a
l~w-supphed liability rule m preliminary bargaining contexts involving sunk costs). I would also
like to thank Professor Ronald J. Coffey for his helpful insights on this point.
S!. See Gillette, supra note 11. at 170.
82. Burton, supra note I, at 134.
83, /d, at 120,

84, See id, at 134-35.

[Vol.

3:1891993]

LOOKING FOR LEGITIMACY

205

down payment on a house. Abbott also sells certificates of deposit
paying 3.85% interest with a mandatory six-month commitment.v'"
Burton argues that under principles of market-mimicking, the law
should treat the parties as if they had a deal for a transaction under
which Costello moves his money into the certificate of deposit
because, if you assume that both parties are rational maximizers, the
certificate of deposit deal would make both parties better off and the
deal should be compelled." Thus, to the extent that one objects to
the results of the market-compelled deal, one necessarily must reject
efficiency principles as a basis for filling gaps: "the defects of compelling market-mimicking deals ex ante reveals the defects in marketmimicking default principles ex post. "87
Although it may be possible to attack efficiency principles
because they elevate the importance of self-interest and thus "obfuscater 1 the role of norms as guides to conduct independent of the
actor's self-interest.T" the Abbott and Costello example does not
undermine the importance of efficiency analysis generally. The logic
of Burton's argument is that because efficiency analysis mandates
compelling deals the parties did not reach, it is a problematic form of
analysis and, therefore, should not be used to fill gaps in incomplete
contracts.
Several difficulties with using the mandated-deal hypothetical
undermine the attack on efficiency analysis. Burton suggests that
under efficiency analysis the parties should be required to "do the efficient thing.'?" Not only would most people intuitively think that the
deal should not be enforced and that there should be no obligation to
do the efficient thing when it means compelling the deal, but economists embracing the efficiency principle would probably also reject the
law mandating a deal as well. Thus, to the extent Burton's attack on
efficiency rests on the poor results of mandated deals, it does not
succeed.
An efficiency analysis would not compel a deal for several reasons. First, efficiency analysis affords maximum domain to autonomy,
so it would reject the forced decision making of mandated deals. Second, compelling a deal for efficiency reasons fails to take account of a
85.

ld, at
at
87, ld. at
88, ld. at
89, ld. at
86.

u:

134.
134-35.
135.
147.
138.
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major premise of efficiency arguments for law-supplied terms, namely
that intervention in the form of a law-supplied term is justified when
the parties face large hurdles to specifying complete terms or reaching
an explicit bargain. To the extent that the legal decision maker identifies significant structural problems of specifying complete terms, the
decision maker may be willing to intervene by supplying a term if she
is convinced that this is the term for which the parties would have
bargained were it not for high transaction costs.?" Since the Abbott
and Costello example seems to display no basic structural impediments to bargaining toward a complete contingent contract, there
would be no particularly compelling reason for the court to intervene
by supplying the term of mandating the efficient deal. In fact, if there
are no barriers to bargaining, the economist would presumably conclude that the decision to remain in the passbook account is the efficient transaction. The economist would posit that even though the
certificate of deposit pays a higher rate, in fact it may represent the
less efficient deal. Because of individual differences in risk aversion,
endowment and preferences, Abbott, the depositor, may prefer the
passbook-it
represents a higher value in use than the value in
exchange resulting from a change to the certificate of deposit. 91
Moreover, economists who accept the proposition that efficiency
is good might well suggest that on the facts of Abbott and Costello,
judicial intervention requiring the efficient deal would not be called
for. Even if the certificate of deposit looks more efficient at first
blush, in fact the legal decision maker can't tell whether the passbook
or certificate of deposit deal is more efficient. In those circumstances
where we don't know which deal is more efficient, the law should not
intervene.f?
90.

See generally Kostritsky, supra note 80,

91,

See

H.

The Psychology of Choice and the Assumptions of Econom139-43 (1991) (stating that differences in loss aversion, for
example, may cause individuals to regard identical asset positions differently). Differences in
risk aversion and preferences may suggest that Costello values six months of liquidity more than
the 1.5% difference in market fate between a CD and a passbook account. Thus, differences in
the preference accorded liquidity may make the seemingly more efficient deal in fact less
efficient.

ics, in QUASI

RICHARD

THALER,

RATIONAL ECONOMICS

92. Implicit in all law-and-economics
scholarship is a disinclination to intervene if intervention.will not enhance efficiency: ~f a law-supplied rule will not improve efficiency, then there
would SImply be no conceptual basis 10 law and economics to intervene. The economist choosing
a default rule would do so on the basis of "adopt[ing] the default rule which is most efficient
(efficient ~n the sense of maximizin.g the sum of the parties' expected utility)." Richard Craswell,
The Relational Move: Some Questions from Law and Economics, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 91
93 (1993). If there were no basis for believing ,that a particular rule would enhance efficiency:
then the court should probably leave the parties where they are. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Jllegal
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Finally the economist might suggest that intervention is inappropriate on the facts of Abbott and Costello because intervention would
prevent parties from making mistakes that might be helpful mistakes
to make. It is only by making mistakes that people learn, and if the
law mandated the efficient deal and parties were thus not permitted to
make mistakes, they might not have the incentive to collect information to decide in the future whether or not a deal is efficient."
Professor Burton has used the Abbott and Costello example to
undermine the value of efficiency analysis generally. He takes a case
where intuitive reactions suggest no liability and asserts that an efficiency analysis would lead to incorrect results. However, even efficiency advocates might well suggest that a mandated deal is
inappropriate. Thus, if we are going to attack efficiency, it must be
because it elevates as a goal the furtherance of the pursuit of selfinterest. However, if one accepts that this goal is a legitimate one that
the law ought to promote, then law-supplied terms may be appropriate to achieve efficient results.
CONCLUSION
This comment agrees with Professor Burton that providing a
legitimate grounding for default principles is crucial. However, Burton's authority of contract model may be misconceived because it is
grounded in the ideal of a fully contingent contract. This comment
argues that in searching for a legitimacy model, the decision maker
must begin with a model that takes full account of the reality of the
incomplete contract. Once that model of behavior is established and a
projection of how parties will respond to various rules is made, it is
possible to legitimate the default rules in consent. I disagree with the
contention that "[a] consent-independent justification ... is needed"?"
for default principles since "consent would not establish which of all
possible default rules are justified.t''" In contrast, I argue that once a
model of behavioral reality is formulated under which a legal decision
maker can identify average goals of parties and their projected reactions to legal intervention, one can hypothesize the parties' consent to
a particular default rule. Without that model, one is left wondering
Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REv. 115,
153 (1988).
93. THALER, supra note 91, at 157.
94. Burton, supra note I, at 155.
95. [d.
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why the coordination principle is the appropriate default rule. Burton's attempts to justify coordination by reference to a party's right to
cooperation and by reference to an implicit agreement leave unanswered the questions of why the coordination principle is part of the
implicit agreement and why there is a right to cooperation if that right
is not in the express agreement. Justifying the coordination principle
requires a model of human behavior that will allow a court to construct an economic model under which parties might implicitly bargain
for a cooperation principle. The decision maker must still resolve
whether it is appropriate for the law to supply the principle based on a
model of the obstacles the parties faced in explicitly adopting the principle, and the costs of alternative private devices to achieve the goals
of cooperation. Thus, this comment suggests that fundamental questions of justification remain unresolved without reference to an economic model of behavior.

